AGE OF FIAT MONEY: DOLLAR AND EURO by George Macesich
G. MACESICH: Age of Fiat Money: Dollar and Euro
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 59 (1-2) 71-77 (2008) 71
AGE OF FIAT MONEY: DOLLAR AND EURO
Fiat Money
There is a profound change in the world’s monetary regime. Since August 
1971, when United States President Richard Nixon closed the gold window and 
thus removed the dollar from any link with gold, the United States and much of 
the world embarked on a fi at monetary regime. One consequence is that there is no 
anchor to the world’s long-term general level of prices. This paper discusses these 
changes for the dollar and the euro, the world’s two major currencies.
Before 1971, a watered down version of the traditional gold standard served 
as the world’s monetary regime. Under such a regime only the U.S. dollar was 
backed by gold. In the post-World War II period, such an arrangement made sense 
since the United States held more than three-quarters of the world gold supply. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, government expenditures in the country increased signifi -
cantly owing to various domestic and foreign programs. Ultimately these expen-
ditures, for the most part, defi cit fi nanced by increases in the supply of dollars, 
led to infl ation and forced the United States and the rest of the world off the gold 
standard in 1971 and on to the fi at standard.1
It is called the “fi at standard” owing to the fact that it is money created by 
government fi at and backed only by the promises of respective countries’ mon-
etary authorities to protect the value of their currencies. It is precisely the value of 
those promises and their ability to provide an anchor to the long-term price level 
that casts in doubt the fi at monetary regime. Past attempts to operate such a regime 
have not been successful.
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Skeptics point to the staggering amount of debt that the United States, Eu-
ropean countries, Japan, and other industrial countries have been running up. In-
deed, Laurence Kotlikoff, an American economist, estimates the present value of 
the United States government’s future obligations, including pensions and health 
care benefi ts, to be $45 trillion. European governments are not much better in 
managing their obligations. And Japan, for instance in 2005, registered a gross 
national debt of more than 160 percent of its Gross Domestic Product.
Thus far the respective monetary authorities and central banks have managed 
a satisfactory operation of the fi at monetary regime, thanks in good part to the in-
dependence granted them by their politicians and governments. If and when some 
or all governments fi nd themselves crushed by debt so-called “independence” of 
their central banks and monetary authorities can be easily removed. What then is 
the worth of their fi at money based as it is on a political promise to pay? Under-
standably the skeptics may turn out to be correct when they cast doubt on a fi at 
monetary regime.
A New World Money?
There is now general agreement that the euro is a major world currency next 
to the dollar and yen. To be sure the dollar’s dominant position in international 
trade and fi nance has given the United States a number of benefi ts including sei-
gniorage from dollars held abroad, liquidity discount on government debt, and the 
ability to fi nance America’s current account defi cits in dollars.
The attractiveness of such benefi ts for Europe underscores the importance of 
the euro. There are however problems in attaining these benefi ts. Robert Mundell, 
for instance, draws on the theory of optimal currency areas to emphasize a number 
of problems, some of which Europe has solved and others, which continue to be 
a challenge.2
In effect, the optimal area for a common currency to be used depends on the 
degree to which real resources can be transferred within it in response to shocks. 
According to Mundell, the issue depends on the mobility of capital and labor. If 
these factors can move easily from a depressed area within the common currency 
zone to a more prosperous one, the zone should continue to use a common cur-
rency. If not, the depressed area should be allowed to depreciate its local currency 
relative to the rest of the zone. This would stimulate local demand for its idle capi-
tal and labor and thus make its products cheaper relative to the rest of the zone. At 
the same time imports from the rest of the zone would be more expensive thereby 
decreasing local demand for output from the rest of the zone. The net effect would 
be to help spread the effects of the shock to the local area’s trading partners.
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Another variation to the theme of optimal currency areas is provided by Ron-
ald McKinnon who argues that if the local area is already open to trade with the 
rest of the currency zone, then local capital and labor would realize that devalua-
tion had reduced their real returns and wages. They would raise their nominal rates 
of return and wages enough to cancel out the effects of devaluation. Accordingly, 
the size of the optimum currency area depends on the intensity of trade within it.
Of course a third way to soften shocks on the local area is by fi scal transfers 
within the common currency zone. This is done, for instance, in the United States 
and in most industrial countries. The EU does appear to have the desire to do the 
same though it remains to be seen whether there is the political will to go along 
with the signifi cant fi scal transfers required in many areas of EU and potential 
member countries.
Many observers agree that while the EU has made progress both in terms of 
mobility of labor and capital and in terms of fi scal transfers, much remains to be 
done. The European labor markets are more rigid than those in the United States. 
Shocks caused by the currency union will very likely last a long time owing to the 
fact that wages are slow to adjust. All of this is further confi rmed by the high rates 
of unemployment in Europe. The conclusion is that only in terms of openness and 
intensity of trade relations do EU countries qualify as comprising an optimum 
currency area. It is likely that smaller countries within the EU will benefi t by a 
common currency with their trading partners, and small countries outside the EU 
that fi nd their trade carried out predominantly with one or more large countries 
within the EU would do well to join in the common currency.
For all its attractiveness to many people, the euro is still the only interna-
tional currency in history that does not have a strong central state or a metallic 
backing. The experiment fl ies in the face of historical experience that political 
union precedes economic union and a single currency. The EU apparently hopes 
to be the exception. At the center of this experiment is the European Central Bank 
(ECB) modeled after the German central bank and charged with maintaining a 
non-infl ationary monetary policy. The ECB is analogous to the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors, while Europe’s national central banks became counterparts 
to the regional banks in the United States.
To judge from the evidence, the Europeans great wish that a strong euro will 
rival the dollar as an international reserve currency, has been realized in good 
measure. The EU is now one of the world’s largest trading regions and its currency 
is one of the world’s most important.
The European visionaries great desire was that a strong EU-wide currency 
will rival the dollar as an international reserve currency helping to make Europe 
an economic giant in the global economy. This, in turn, they envision will lead 
to the formulation of a political and security union in Europe. One can only wish 
them well and success.
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For a heavily taxed and regulated EU with social welfare problems, Europe 
has its challenges that a single currency may not be able to address effectively. 
Countries still in control of most economic and social policies will continue to 
grow at different rates. If they are unable to alter exchange rates, unemployment 
and eventually declining wage rates will become the necessary adjustment means. 
It should come as no surprise that political reaction will likely occur as a result. As 
a result progress toward political union will not be easy.
The international implication for a euro-dollar has been understood by vari-
ous observers. If confi dence in the ECB is established there may well be signifi -
cant diversifi cation from the dollar to the euro. Some countries may well opt to 
keep more of their reserves in euros. If the European venture is successful it may 
provoke the formation of an Asian monetary union pushed by Japan, China, and 
other Asian countries. The world will have alternative assets to the dollar and 
euro to use in international reserves as a by-product. In itself, this is an attractive 
option to other countries if any one of the three leading currencies lean toward 
instability.
The European Central Bank (ECB) plays a singularly critical role in the EU. 
Although designed to be independent from political pressure, the ECB is hav-
ing a tough time guarding its status from European politicians pushing their own 
views of interest rates and related issues. It is thus not surprising that not every-
one agrees that central bank independence is a good thing. Doubters suggest that 
the supposed correlation between central bank independence and low infl ation is 
suspect. Even if correct, the “credibility” issue that goes with the argument for 
independence may not hold. It is diffi cult, so the argument goes, to objectively 
defi ne “independence.” Sometimes one or another defi nition is used. Other studies 
do fi nd such a correlation.
The received central bank argument that independence increases credibility 
and credibility of getting infl ation down may not be correct. Evidence suggests 
that central bank independence fails to reduce the cost of disinfl ation and may 
actually increase it. Indeed, in countries with relatively independent central banks, 
the record suggests that this in fact is the case. Again, the problem may be in 
the proper defi nition of “independence.” Of course other possibilities including 
independence and low infl ation are jointly the result of some third factor such as 
society’s willingness to tolerate high infl ation. Also, it may well be that central 
bankers are less sensitive to unemployment than politicians. In any event, the 
ECB is designed to be the most “independent” in the world and in time the EU and 
the rest of the world can judge the results.
Some members of the EU expect great things from a single currency. Oth-
ers are not sure what the future may bring. Germany hopes a single currency will 
reduce European tensions. Spain looks toward a reduction in regional economic 
disparity. France hopes that the euro will become an important counterweight to 
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the dollar. Britain tends to look at the euro as a threat to its own exceptionalism. 
Italy apparently sees the euro as a means for bringing about order in its own mon-
etary and fi nancial affairs.
A single currency does have an important benefi t particularly in improving 
the transparency and effi ciency of a single European market. On this score, indi-
viduals are better able to judge the value of investments. It is not clear that a single 
European currency and monetary union before a true political union will do much 
for real or imagined problems and insecurities that many Europeans have.
It also may well be that in the fi nal analysis the European monetary union 
is political. One senses that many European leaders view monetary union as de-
sirable because it will contribute to a European political union. If the European 
monetary union and the euro fail, European political unions may indeed be set 
back with little future prospects.
If Europe and its euro are to achieve the many goals set, it is essential to 
open up trade and capital markets to non-Europeans as well as non-members. 
Until such an opening is fully, or in good measure, achieved, the role of the euro 
as an international reserve currency—and of the European Union as an economic 
power will be limited. In fact, it may be tempting for the Europeans to mimic the 
“benign neglect” they have often accused Americans of following for the dollar. 
Some observers hold that with the euro and dollar concentrating exclusively on 
domestic concerns, world instability might increase. This is a lesson that should 




A Return to Gold?
Skeptics of both the dollar and euro call for monetary reform. The usual call 
is for a monetary regime anchored by a dollar convertible into gold. These calls 
repeatedly stress the dissatisfaction with the existing fi at monetary regime.
Critics of the fi at monetary regime note in particular that this regime fails 
to deal properly with the problem of defi ning a monetary standard of measure-
ment. There is the question of the global unit of account for signaling value across 
borders. Capital fl ows are in jeopardy thanks in good measure to the absence of 
a sound monetary regime. It is little wonder that some emerging countries, in the 
view of critics, are opting to withdraw from the global economy and abandon the 
free market rather than be victimized by monetary chaos. The crisis in the closing 
years of the twentieth and into the twenty-fi rst centuries is largely the result of a 
fi at monetary regime that has broken down.
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The way to put matters right, in the view of these critics, is to adopt a global 
gold standard. Unlike the failed Bretton Woods regime, which was a gold ex-
change standard whereby only the United States was required to convert the dollar 
into gold at a fi xed rate and only foreign central banks were allowed the privilege 
of redemption, their proposal is for a return to the classic international gold stan-
dard. In effect, countries would once again be required to maintain convertibility 
into gold of their currencies and permit every individual the right to redeem their 
cash balances into gold.
These proposals are straightforward. Under the gold standard (or specie stan-
dard) a country is committed to keeping the price of gold fi xed and is willing to 
convert its money into gold at a fi xed price. In such a regime, the country’s mon-
etary authorities must maintain gold reserves suffi cient for the volume of sales 
that may be necessary from time to time to peg the price of gold successfully. 
Such authorities would be required to sell gold whenever the price of gold tended 
to rise. If the monetary authorities were to pursue a discretionary policy that re-
sulted in infl ation, the prices of all goods and services, including gold, would rise. 
In such an event, the rise in the price of gold would necessitate gold sales by the 
monetary authorities which would eventually deplete the country’s gold reserve. 
As a result, the monetary authorities of a country on a gold standard cannot carry 
out a serious discretionary monetary policy.
The advantage of a gold standard is its tendency toward a predictable long-
run value of a gold standard country’s money. In effect, the country’s monetary 
authorities assure that its money and gold are perfect substitutes. The aggregate 
price level in such a country is thus inversely related to the value of gold relative 
to other goods and services. If gold falls in value because the price level has risen, 
there is a disincentive to mine more of it.
If there are exogenous shocks, such as discoveries of new gold, unpredict-
able swings in the value of money can occur. A number of examples are readily 
available from monetary history, e.g., California and Alaska gold discoveries in 
the nineteenth century.
A study by Anna J. Schwartz compares the economy under the historical 
gold standard with the experience of the United States and United Kingdom fol-
lowing World War II.3 The study suggests that during the era of the gold standard, 
substantially lower rates of infl ation were registered than in the period following 
World War II. There was also greater variability of real per capita increase in in-
come.
Schwartz also notes that a shift to a true gold standard would be a shift to 
a monetary regime that would fi nd few supporters. Moreover, even if the United 
States, for instance, adopted a gold standard monetary regime, it is not certain 
that prices would be more predictable than under alternative regimes (Schwartz 
discusses why in the aforementioned study.)
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The gold standard monetary regime was abandoned when conversion of do-
mestic money into gold ceased. In the post-World War II period, fi xed exchange 
rates under the Bretton Woods system evolved into adjustable pegged exchange 
rates. When confi dence in American gold-dollar convertibility and its role as the 
dominant reserve currency eroded in the 1970s, the Bretton Woods system, in ef-
fect, collapsed. Gold ceased to play a monetary role.
Thereafter, the world embarked on a discretionary fi at monetary regime 
with “managed fl exible rates.” The results have not been altogether satisfactory. 
Indeed, in some countries the results have been high and variable infl ation and 
interest rates, low productivity growth, and unstable exchange rates, prompting 
discussion of returning to the gold standard and fi xed exchange rates as a way of 
improving performance.4
Any discussion of a return to a gold standard must confront the reluctance of 
countries to give up discretionary authority over monetary affairs. This is also a 
problem for a fi at money regime governed by a rule for the growth of the money 
supply.5 The failure, moreover, of the U.S. Gold Commission in 1982 to endorse 
a larger role for gold in contemporary monetary affairs puts to rest its serious 
consideration.6 Nevertheless, the gold standard regime continues its appeal for 
many people—witness the continued price quotation for gold on the world’s stock 
exchanges.
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